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ABSTRACT
Technology change is modeled as the result of decisions of
individuals and groups of individuals to adopt more advanced
technologies. The structure is calibrated to the U.S. and
postwar Japan growth experiences. Using this calibrated
structure we explore how large the disparity in the effective tax
rates on the returns to adopting technologies must be to account
for the huge observed disparity in per capita income across
countries. We find that this disparity is not implausibly
large.
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NBEROne need only look at a copy of the World Development Report or the
survey by Summers and Heston 11988] to see how incredibly diverse per capita
income levels are across countries.Such diversity has not always been a
characteristic of the data, however.By Rosenberg and Birdzell's account
119901, income levelsin the 18th century were fairly uniform across
countries.The current diversity clearly then reflects a tendency for
countries to develop at different rates and at different times.
The countries that were first to industrialize and thus break from the
rest of the world tended to be located in Western Europe.These countries
were later followed by the U.S. and Canada.Most recently, several
countries centered about the Pacific Rim have made the leap.Many of the
countries in this latter group have in the process experienced rates of
growth that are spectacular relative to historicalstandards. Some
countries, most notably those of sub-Sahara Africa, have yet to make the
transition.
That there is greater diversity in income levels today than three
centuries ago is clear.However, it would, we believe, be misleading to
identify this occurrence as a spreading out of the distribution of per
capita Income levels.Within the set of non—African countries, the recent
trend has been for income levels to move towards the mean.If spreading
out of the distribution were a characteristic of the data, then it should be
the case that within the set of non-African countries per capita income
levels move away from the mean as well.
Why some countries have been able to make the leap while others have
not, and why amongst those countries having made the transition performances
differ, are, we think, the central issues that confront the field ofeconomic growth, and the ones inwhich our current efforts are intended to
resolve.We believe that a theory, if it is to have any hope of accounting
for these observations, must have as its central focus technological change.
Our view differs from neoclassical growth theory, however, in that we
believethis change to occur only whenindividuals, or groups of
individuals, make specific decisions to adopt new technologies.For us
then, the question of why differences in growth rates and income levels
exist across countries is really a question of why all countries do not
adopt the same technologies at the same time.
While some period of time may elapse before individuals in one country
become aware of a technological discovery in another country, we do not
believe this to be the reason these differences exist.Most industry
studies suggest that the adoption of a new technology requires investment in
capital, with a substantial fraction taking the form of investment in
intangible capital.In adopting a computer, for example, a firm must not
only make the necessary investment in hardware and software, but it must
train its personnel in the use of' the new system. This training of personal
represents a substantial diversion of resources away from productive
activities.
Instead, what matters in determining whether a particular technology
will be adopted is the return that the individual, or group of individuals,
making the adopting decision expects to earn on its investment.There is,
we think, a large body of evidence that indicates that the institutional
arrangements within a country can substantially reduce this return.The
ways in which these institutional arrangements can reduce this return are
not limitedtoofficial government taxes on capital. Olson 11982]
emphasizes the role of redistributional coalitions and Krueger (1974]
2emphasizes the role of rent seeking activity.We believe that these
difference in institutionaltaxes" across countries explain the observed
diversity in per capita income levels.
There re many instances where relatively permanent changes in the
institutional arrangements within a country have been associated with
noticeable changes in that country's income level relative to the rest of
the world and sustained, but not permanent, changes in its growth rate.
Before 1980, black peasant farmers in Zimbabwe were forbidden to bring their
crops to markets.With the end of white minority rule in 1980 thIs all
changed. The new government took further steps to allow farmers to realize
a higher return on their investments by beginning a program where
agriculturalspecialistsweresentouttodemonstrateproductivity
increasing techniques.As a result of these changes, output of cotton,
peanuts, and corn by Zimbabwe's black peasant farmers has more than tripled
over a 10-year period.These farmers now account for over 607. of the
country's corn production and 507. of the country's cotton production whereas
only 10 years ago, these farmers accounted for only 57. of the country's
total productIon of these commodities (Henry 1990a).
The experience of Zimbabwe is consistent with the finding of L.G.
Reynolds (19831 who traced the development of 41 "Third World Countries'
over the 1850—1980 period.In all but four countries, Reynolds found that
the period in which each country first experienced a sustained increase in
its level of per capita income directly followed a "signifIcant political
event".In most all cases, this "significant political event" Involved the
transfer of ruling power to a more progressive, growth orientated regime,
The recentexperienceofJapanisagainillustrativeof the
productivity gains that can berealizedifa country'sinstitutional
3arrangements improve so as to allow individuals adopting new technologies to
keep more of the return on their investment. There does not seem to be any
macroeconomic policy to which one can point that would seem capable of
explaining Japan's post World War II experience. We dismiss the argument
that the destruction of plant and machinery associated with Japan's defeat
explains that country's success.If this were the cause, why then was the
experience of East Germany so poor relative to West Germany over this same
period?What the loss in that war did accomplish though was to remove
Japan'sinstitutionalarrangements. Intheirplace,institutional
arrangements closely resembling those of the U.S. were substituted.It is
in this sense that the war served as a catalyst for growth.
This account seems far more consistent with Japan's actual experience
than the account implied by the neoclassical growth model.Japan's decade
of "golden growth' was the 1960's.This isin contradiction to the
predictions of the neoclassical growth theory that Japan's growth rates
should have been highest in the years directly following the war.In terms
of Japan's institutional arrangements, change continued to occur well after
the war's end.One important change occurred in 1960 when labor unions,
which had enjoyed considerable strength during the 1950's due to U.S.
encouragement, collided head on with management.The result of this
confrontation was that labor unions in Japan became passive, acquiescent,
and conservative.
While Japan's growth rate of per capita income over the second half of
the postwar period has been substantially lower than its growth rate over
the first half of that period, its average annual rate of growth of 6.067.
between 1950 and 1985 is still spectacular relative to historical standards.
That such large productivity gains were realized by Japan, and some othercountries as well, is surely a result of these countries' relative positions
in the world at the time of the change in their institutions.A poorer
country has the potential to realize large increases in productivity once
the institutional arrangements of that country change so as to allow
individuals to keep more of the returns on their investments, and these new
institutional arrangements are expected by individuals to survive into the
future. Thisis because poorer countries are most likely to adopt
technologies thatalreadyhave beensuccessfullyadoptedinricher
countries,Consequently, poorer countries will have available to them more
information of what to do for successful adoption.For this reason, a
poorer country with the identical institutional arrangements as a richer one
need not invest as much as the richer country to realize a given increase in
productivity.
Solow (1956, footnote 7) recognized that aggregation over firms results
in an aggregate production function that exhibits constant returns to scale
provided the firm ultimately faces diminishing returns.This for Solow
justified beginning at the aggregate level.We believe that we can learn a
great deal by going back a level.Consequently, we start at the
disaggregate level.The firm technology we consider builds upon the
span-of-control model introduced by Lucas [19781.A firm is run by a
manager, or coalition of managers, who make investments in intangible
technology capital.Intangible capitalis combined with tangible capital
and labor inputs to produce output.For a given stock of intangible
capital,there are diminishing returns with respect to tangible capital and
labor inputs.The return earned by a firm onits investment in capital
depends upon the institutional arrangements associated with the country in
which the firm is located and the firm's current technology (as reflected byits present stock of intangiblecapital)relative to the world technology.
Our hope is that such a theory can account for the experiences of most
countries.Obviously, the length of this paper does not allow for such an
analysis.We do, however, in the tradition of Solow [1970] and more
recentlyLucas119881,calibratethe model toU.S.steadystate
observations.In addition, we calibrate the model to the experience of
Japan over the 1950-1985 period.Using the calibrated model, we analyze the
level effects associated with these institutional arrangements and compare
their size with the observed differences in per capita income levels across
countries.
This paper is organized as follows.Section II develops the model.
Section IIIcalibrates the model to the U.S. steady state observations and
the postwar experience of Japan.Section IV takes the calibrated model and
analyzes the effects of these institutional taxes on steady state income
levels. Section V consists of some concluding remarks.
11. Model Economy
Much of the groundwork for this theory was laid by Parente 119901. We
use the basic structure of that model, but extend it by introducing a
version of the Lucas span-of—control modelto the production technology so
as to be able to distinguish between labor and capital inputs.This
extension permits us to match the Parente model to the National Income and
Product Account data.
The Household
Thehousehold is assumed to value a composite commodity made up of a
consumption good, c, and services generated by the stock of household
6durables, d.In addition to this composite commodity,the householdis
assumed to derive utility from a public good which we denote by g.This
good is viewed in the model as being local in nature (i.e. parks, libraries,
fire and police services, et al).In order to simplify the analysis, we
assume that the household's utility is additively separable in the composite
commodity and the public good.





where0 << 1,0 << 1,o >1,and U is strictly increasing in g.
Leisure is suppressed from the household's utility as the labor—leisure
decisionin not that central to growth.
The time endowment of the household in every period is one.In addition
the household is endowed at date 0 with a stock of durables d. To simplify
subsequent analysis and notation we assume that this initial stock is the
same for all households. The stock of durables is assumed to depreciate at
a rate of '5 .If xdenotes additions to a household's stock of durable
d dt
goods at time t, then its stock in period t+l is
(2) dt+l = (1dt+ Xt.
TheFirm
Foreach household there corresponds a firm that at any date that
household can manage if it chooses to do so. 2 Each firm at date 0 has
associated with it an initial technology level A and an initial stock of
tangible capital K. For simplicity, we assume that A0 and K are the same
7for- all firms. A manager at date t hires labor Nt and combines it with the
firms tangible capital K and technology level At. to produce output Y
according to the following production function
''
The parameter M indexes the managerial talent of a particular household.
The function h is assumed to be increasing and concave in K and N. In this
paper, h is given the following functional form
(4) h(K,N) = K0[min(N,N)]10 0 < 8 < I,N > 0.
The time requirement to manage a firm in any period is 1 so that a household
that manages a firm in period t cannot supply labor- elsewhere in the
economy.
Output can be used by the household for consumption and/or investment
indurables, and by the firm for investment in business tangible capital
and/or- to adopt a more advanced technology.A firm's stock of tangible
capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate . Let Xt denote the amount of
investment in tangible capital by a firm at time t.Then that firm's
tangible stock of capital in period t+l is
(5) K =(1—ó)-K +X t+l ktkt
The increaseinthe firm's technologylevelresulting from an
investment of XA units of output depends on its current level of technology
relative to the level of world technology at the time of investment.The
world technology at time t is denoted by W. The world technology is meant
to represent the stock of pure or disembodied knowledge (i.e. blueprints,
ideas, scientific knowledge).For the purpose of this paper, W is assumedto be determined outside the model and to grow at the constant rate of •
Thus,
(6) W=W(l+y ). t•tt w
Given the world technology at time t and given a firm's current
technology level A. the amount of investment needed to realize a technology




Integration of (7) yields
A - A (8)(a + l)X =t.it At
W•(1 +
Without loss of generality, we set W0 equal to 1.
The only way any firm can raise its technology level from A to A' is if
that firm makes the investment XA given by equation (7). In this sense,
technology is firm specific.We treat tangible capital in the model as
being firm specific as well.This implies that a firm which is not operated
in some period cannot rent out its tangible capital stock or license Its
technology.
Feasibility requires that at each date the number of managers and the
number of workers per firm equal the size of the work force. We denote the
size of the work force in period t by Lt.In this paper, we Ignore
population growth. Thus, Lt is assumed to equal L for all time. Because our
emphasis is primarily on growth and less on the size and distribution of
9firms we simply assume that there are M =L/(N+l)households with managerial
talent i.' => 0 and L -Mhouseholds with managerial talent i0.Given
this assumption it immediately follows that in equilibrium there will be M
firms in the economy each of which employs N units of labor at each date.
Given that we assume all firms begin with the same technology level A0 and
tangible capital stock K0, in equilibrium the date t product of each firm
will be
=
From(9) it is apparent that it is impossible for Y, A, and K to all
grow at the same rate along a balanced growth path. However, if we define
Aa 1
(10) Z =t andX =X
t ZtAt
(1 +
andmake the corresponding change in variables, it is possible to define a
steady state solution where Y, K, X, Z, and X all grow at the same rate .
VariableZ will have the interpretation of a firm's stock of intangible or
technology capital.
In this Z-space, the date t product of a firm becomes
(11) = +




From(11) and (12) it follows that in order forY,K, and Z to allgrow
at a rate of y, the following relation betweenandmust hold:
1-G Ca.1)J/ (13) 1 + =(1+)
10Aggregation across firms in the economy implies the following aggregate
per capita production relation:
etit.i —i—e01/(+1) (14) y= •(i+) •N
where= (1 +N)h,'(ai' )lHere, and in subsequent analysis, lower case
letters denote per capita values of the corresponding variables.
Our interest is in the ratio of variables to output.Consequently, the
values for N and ijarenot central to our experiments.The choice of
managerial ability,ii,is clearly arbitrary.Without loss of generality,





Asthis theory is intended to be one of growth and not one of
institutional arrangements, we are not concerned with the exact manner by
which these arrangements reduce the return that an individual, or group of
individuals, adopting a new technology earns on its• investment, only that
these institutional arrangements reduce this return.For this reason we
simply treat a country's institutional arrangements as a tax on the returns
to tangible and intangible capital in the business sector.The tax on
intangible business capital at time t is
(16) r 'r zz z t
where ris the steady State marginal product of intangible capital.The
tax on tangible business capital at time t is
(17)
where rk is the steady state marginal product net of depreciation of
11tangible capital.
We use the steady state marginal product on tangible capital net of
depreciationbecausetangiblecapitalphysicallydepreciates andthis
depreciationis taken into account for tax purposes. In contrast,
intangible capital does not physically wear out.It depreciates only in the
sense that over time, as the level of world technology increases, its price
falls.
It is very easy to think of ways in which these taxes are redistributed
or dissipated.Within the lesser developed countries of the world, a large
percentage of these, tax receipts tend to be pocketed by government
officials.Henry (1990.b], for example, reports that in Tanzania corruption
within the government is so excessive that Tanzanians refer to government
spending programs as "public air" because the money supposedly marked for
these projects is rarely spent on such projects. To be concrete, we assume
that all such tax receipts are used to provide the Local public good.Our
results would not change if we were to assume some or all of these goods
were used in unproductive ways. The technology for producing this good is
assumed to be such that one unit of tax revenue results in one Unit of the
public good.
In light of this redistributional scheme and the tax revenues given by
equations (161 and (17), the resource constraint for our economy is
a t/(a+i) 8 1/(+1)
(18)c +x + x + x = (l+y ) •k z- r r z - t r t ktdtzt W tt zz t kkt
and
(19) g= t •r•z +t •rk
t zz tk k t
12The Competitive Equilibrium
Ahousehold at each date either manages a firm or supplies work
elsewhere in the economy. We permit households to go from being managers to
workers and vice a versa between any two periods. However, since capital is
firm specific, a firm that is not managed in a given period is assumed to
lose both its tangible and intangible capital stocks.Furthermore, we
assume that a firm's capital stocks can only be increased if a manager is on
hand in the preceding period to make the investments. Thus, any time a firm
is started up again by its manager, its output in that period is zero.Let
Indicate whether a firm is or is not managed in period t.A value of 1
for m indicates that the firm is managed in period t while a value of 0
indicates that the firm is not managed in period t.The problem facing a
manager—firm given the institutional arrangements of the country in which it
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kktzz t
subjecttoconstraints(4),(11),and(12),subjecttoconstraints
K =Z=0whenever m 0 and subject to initial capital stocks K and t+1t+1 t 0
Z.Here, are the Arrow-Debreu prices of the composite commodity
and (w) are the real wages. Both and aretaken as given
by the manager-firm.
To be specific and to keep the notation to a minimum, we assume that
all households have the same initial wealth.Given our assumptions
concerning preferences, equilibrium prices and market clearing quantities
are the same whether initial wealth is distributed evenly or unevenly.Let
13V denote this initial per capital wealth. Each manager owns the firm it
operates so that any manager whose firm has a sufficiently large present
value must have debts at date 0 just large enough so that its initial wealth
is V, Any households that never manages and any manager whose firm has a
sufficiently small present value must have claims at date 0 just large
enough so that their individual initial wealths are also V0.
A consistency requirement is that aggregate wealth LV satisfy
(21) LV0 = E V(K,Z)
wherethesummation istakenover all firms in the economy.
Given the assumption of equal wealth, all households face the same
problem. This problem is to maximize
t 1 (22)
.dt )
subjectto theconstraint that a household is either a manager orworker at





andsubject to initialcapital stock d.The household, likethe
manager-firm,takes and{w) as given.
SteadyState Analysts
We exploitthe fact that the competitive equilibrium allocation solves









iii.d1 =(I— + x,
iv.(l+z)z1 =z+ (l+a)'x
givenz, d, k, r, andr. 00 0 k z
Thereare two special features of the problem that result In the
competitive allocation being the one which solves this program.The first
is that households' preference orderings on private consumptions are
independent of public consumptlons.The second is that taxes on capital
stocks can be treated as if they were features of the technology. The taxes
paid by a firm depend only on its stocks and not the stocks of other firms.
The date t decision variables for this problem arek+1, dt+l. and
The amount of local public good, is not a decision variable. The
amount of the public good consumed each period Is simply determined by the
amount of tax revenues collected in each period. Thus, the choices of
d+i. zfl, and c are not affected by
In steady state, all variables grow at the rate of '.Forthis reason,
we find it convenient to divide each variable by (1 + 7)t and redefine each
appropriately.Thus, in what follows, all lower case variables represent
per capita values divided by (1 + 7)tWith the change in variables, the
15relevant problem is
(25)maximize [ti (c d-
subject to
01/(a+I) t.c +x +x s-x =kz -t'rz-rrk t wt cit zttt zztk Ict
ii. k= (1 - 6 )k + 1 x t+l Ict —kt
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and
= fl(l+
Itis clear for this system that the prices of each of the capital
goods will not all be equal.We find it convenient to redefine variables in
such a way so that these prices are all equal to one.This is done by
multiplying capital constraints (ii)—(iv) by their respective price q3 and
16by redefining variables
z= k = dt
=




i.c +x +x +x =Q.ke.z1_t.r.z,'q_w.r.k,q t lit .ititt ti it zk lit k
ii. =(1—6k1't
+
iii. d=(1-6)d + 'x t+l4 t dt
iv. =(l-6);+x t+l itit
where
(o—1)'(i—Ø) —e-a/(a+l) and
In finding the steady state solution, we first substitute constraints
(ii)—(iv) into constraint Ii), and then substitute constraint (i) forc in
equation (26).We then take derivatives with respect to kt+l. z+1 and
dt+j.In taking these derivatives, we treat rk andrz parametrically.
Next we substitute into these first order necessary conditions the marginal
product of intangible capital for rz and the marginal product of tangible
capital net of depreciation of tangible capital for rk. both of which are
17functions of k and z.Lastly,we invoke the steady state condition that
kt= k, dt =d.andz for all time and then solve for k, d, and z.
0ff-Steady State Analysis
The system given by (26) is a well behaved, deterministic, discounted
dynamic program with returns bounded from above (note c >1).Consequently
(see Stokey et al., Theorems 4.2 and 4.14, 1989). successive approximations
to optimality equation, beginning with a bounded initial approximation,
converge to the optimal return function.This optimal return function can
be used to find an optimal policy rule which is a stationary Markov policy
in the state variable (d,k,z).Indeed, this policy rule generates the
uniqueoptimalsequence.The uniquenessof the optimal policy sequence
followsfrom the strictconcavityof the returnfunctionin (c,d), the
strict concavity of theproduction functionin (k,z), and the fact that the
return function is strictlyincreasing inc.
III. Model Calibration
In the tradition of Solow (1957]wecalibrate the model to 1987 U.s.
National Income and Product Accounts.In doing so, we use aperiodof
length one year. Our source of these accounts is the Economic Report of the
PresIdent 1990.Inaddition,we calibratethe model to thepostwar
experienceof Japan. That experiment isbasedupon the assumptionthatthe
institutional arrangements of the U.S. and Japan were identical in 1950 and
have not changed since. Thus, the only difference, assumed to exist between
the two countries lies in their 1950capitalstocks.The calibration of the
model to the experience of Japan,considerstheoff—steady state properties
18of the system while the calibration of the model to the U.S. National Income
and Product Accounts considers only the steady state properties of the
model.The observations pertaining to the calibration of the model to
Japan's postwar experience are taken from the Summers and Heston data set.
Some variables in our model do not correspond exactly to those measured
in either the National Income and Product Accounts or the Summers and Heston
survey.Most notably is the failure of U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts to measure the stock of intangible capital and investment in that
capital.For this reason, output in our model will differ from the numbers
reported in the National Income and Product Accounts by the amount of
investment in intangible capital.
In light of the specification of our economy, other adjustments to the
National Income and Product Accounts are called for as well.First, we
reduce GNP by the amount of housing services.Since we treat residential
structures as part of household capital,such an adjustment seems
appropriate.Given that final real estate services product is approximately
10 percent of GNP, measured output in our model , y-x, is.9OGNP.
Second, we separate consumption expenditures on durables from consumption
expenditures on non-durables and services and include the former in the
category of investment in household capital.Third, we remove residential
investment from gross private investment, and add it to the category of
investment in household capital.Fourth, we assign 10 percent of government
purchases to investment in tangible business capital.This we do because
public investments in infrastructure increase private business productivity.
The remaining fraction of government purchases is identified with household
consumption of the local public good in the model.
Our economy is a closed system.Therefore, there is the question of
19how to treat net exports listed in the National Income and Product Accounts.
We simply choose to increase real GNP by the amount of net exports, and
assume that for each expenditure category, the expenditure on net exports
increases the expenditure category by the same percentageas net exports
increases GNP.
After making such adjustments, the ratio of Consumption to measured GNP
for the U.S. in 1987 is .54, the ratio of investment in durables to measured
GNP is .15, the ratio of investment in tangible capital to measured GNP is
.14, and the ratio of consumption of the public good to measured GNP is .17.
In addition to these statistics, the model is calibrated to the ratio of
nonhousehold tangible capital to measured GNP, to the ratio of household
capital to measured GNP, to theU.S. steady state growth rates of per
capita consumption and output, to the real return on equity in the U.S. over
the postwar period, and to business tangible capital share of output less
investment in intangible business capital.
The ratio of tangible business capital to measured GNP in the U.S. is
approximately 1.25.With the capital of the government, we believe a ratio
of 1.75 for nonhousehold tangible capital to measured GNP is reasonable.
The ratio of the stock of household capital to measured GNP for the U.S. is
approximately 1.25. Using the Summers and }-Ieston data, the growth rate of
both per capita output and consumption in the U.S. is approximately 27.. The
real return on equity in the U.S. over the postwar period is 6.57..
The share parameter for tangible capital Sk for our model economy is
(28)
Sk(rk + .).k/(y — x).
To compute the counterpart of this statistic for the U.S. economy we proceed
as follows: To estimate the numerator of (28) we subtract from .90GNP our
20estimates of payments to labor.In payments to labor we include all
compensation of employees, fraction of entrepreneur income, fraction
of surplus on government enterprises, and 50 percent of indirect business
taxes. Our resulting estimated value of Sk is .25.
The preference parameters whose values are selected to match these
steady state observations are the relative rate of risk aversion o, the
consumption share parameter 4> in the utility function, and the subjective
time discount factor .The condition that the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption between c and c+1 equals the marginal rate of
substitution in exchange between c and cr1. when c and d grow at the
constant rate ', requires that (1+r) = (1+7)°/where r denotes the real
rate of interest.Because we calibrate the model to r =065 and= .02,
our selections of values for the subject time discount factorand the
relative rate of risk aversion c are required to satisfy 1.065 = ii.ozf/.
Using theutilitymaximizingconditionthatthe marginal rate of
substitution in consumption between c and d+1 equals the marginal rate of
substitution in exchange between ct and d+1the consumption share
parameter 4> in the utility function together with parameters,and d' and
the real rate of interest r are required to satisfy(ãd+r)/l(1+r)(l—4>)l
= c/d when c and d grow at the constant rate '. While we do not calibrate
the model to the ratio of consumption expenditures to the stock of household
capital for the U.S. in 1987, we do find that the ratio of consumption to
the stock of household capital corresponding to our parameterized model is
quite close to this ratio for the U.S.
The technology parameters whose values are to be chosen are 7, 0, ,
• and a . In addition, the tax rates, r and t •must be chosen.Since
K d K z
the growth rate of per capita output for the U.S. over the 1950-1985 period
21was approximately 27., a, and & must satisfy equation (13) for a growth
rateequal to .02.As long as tangible capital is paid its marginal
physical product, the parameter 0 equals (rk+5k) k/y.Decause we calibrate
the model to k=25 where s=(r+).kJ(y_x) our selection for 8 must
satisfy 8(y-x)/y=.25.
The parameter a has important implications for how fast a country will
approach its steady state. We are not aware of any existing studies which
would restrict the range of values for a. Nor can the value of a be tied
down within the model using U.S. data alone, but by using the Japanese data
as well and considering the off—steady state properties of the model, the
value for a can be pinned down.
For the institutional "tax" on business tangible capital, t, we select
a rate of 1/3.This is approximately equal to the ratio of total revenues
in 1985 from all tangible capital taxation to total tangible capital income
calculated by Lucas U9891.For the institutional 'tax" on intangible
capital, t, we treat it symmetrically and set it to 1/3.
Capital consumption allowance with capital consumption adjustment in
1987 was roughly 127. of total output.If this entire amount corresponded to
depreciation on capital in the business sector it would imply an annual
depreciation rate of roughly 9.57. on this capital stock.It is not clear,
however, how much of this corresponds to depreciation on household capital
and how much corresponds to depreciation on non—household capital, It is,
further, unclear as to how much depreciation in the household's capital
stock goes unmeasured.For these reasons, we do not believe an annual
depreciation rate on tangible capital and a depreciation rate on durables of
roughly 87. is unreasonable.
The computational experiments whose results are reported below involve
22the following steps.First a set of parametric values for the model is
chosen.Once thisselectionis made, the steady statesolutionis
calculated and this solution is Compared to the steady state ratios for the
U.S. listed above,If a solution is not inconsistent with these statistics,
we then proceed to determine whether the model, with that particular set of
parametric values, can account for the postwar experience of' Japan.This
experience was that Japan per capita income increased from 1/6th to 3/4ths
of the U.S. level in the 1950-1985 period.
We use the methods of dynamic programming to determine the optimal
policy functions corresponding to the system described by (26).Once these
functions are found, we trace out the optimal path for a country which
begins with roughly 1/6th of its steady state income in 1950.If we find
that after a 36 year period, the per capita income level for this artificial
economy is not approximately 3/4ths of its steady state level, we consider a
new set of parametric values, and begin the experiments again.
The parametric values that seem to provide the best fit to the U.S.
steady state observations and the postwar experience of Japan are listed in
Table I.Table II compares the steady state solution of the model with the
observation for the U.S., while Figure 1 plots the off—steady state path
traced by the model to the actual path for Japan.As both Table II and
Figure 1 demonstrate, the model's fit is quite good.
IV. Level Effects
The most striking feature of the data is the tremendous diversity in
per capita income levels that exists across countries.A crucial test of a
theory of growth is whether it can account for this diversity.Our theme is
that this diversity is the result of the differences in taxes" imposed by a
23countrys institutional arrangements on the return to the investment of an
individual or group of individuals adopting a more advanced technology.
Todeterminetheleveleffectsassociatedwithacountry's
institutional arrangements, we simply calculate the steady state solution to
the model for various tax rates keeping all other parameters to their values
of Section III.Table Ill reports the steady state income levels for pairs
of tax rates It ,r ).Ascan be seen from the table, differences in the k z
taxes imposed by a country's institutional arrangements can result in large
differences in steady state income levels.Differences in tax rates, for
example, of a factor 3 can lead to differences in steady state per capita
output of a factor 84.
As the table also indicates, the tax on the return to intangible
capital is associated with much larger level effects than the tax on the
return to tangible capital.Holding the tax rate on tangible capital fixed
and changing the tax rate on intangible capital by roughly a factor 3 result
in level effects of roughly a factor 25.Holding the tax rate on intangible
capital fixed and changing the tax rate on tangible capital by a factor 3,
however, only result in level effects of roughly a factor 3.
V. Conclusion
It is clear that the model proposed here is not one of endogenous
growth.While growth arises because of specific decisions by agents to
adopt more advanced technologies, neither preference parameters nor policy
parameters affect growth rates.However, we see this as a virtue of the
model, and not a deficiency.If savings rates had growth rate effects then
the distribution of per capita income across countries would have to spread
24out over time. This we do not see in the data.
For us then, a crucial feature of a model is that the level effects
generated within it be large enough to account for the huge observed
disparityin per capita incomes across countries and that the implied
disparity in relevant parameters generating these level effects not be
inconsistent with observation.Our theme is that differences in effective
tax rates on the returns to technology adoption across countries are
fundamental to understanding the huge diversity in per capita incomes. Our
model, calibrated to the postwar growth experiences of the U.S. and Japan
can account for this tremendous diversity with, what we think, is an
entirety plausible implied range of tax rates.
Plausible,however,is not quantitatively meaningful.What is
desperately needed is measurement of these returns across countries.Given
the success of this theory and given the vast amount of anecdotal evidence
that suggests that a country's institutional arrangements affectits
economic performance, our hope is that effort and research will be directed
to this endeavor.
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27Footnotes
Observtions for all 130 countries in the Summers and Heston data set
are available only for the years 1973 through 1985.Over this 13 year
period the standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita output for the
non—African countries in the data set decreases by 77..
2Forsimplicity, we assume that a single manager operates a firm. For
an extension to coalition management, see Prescott and Boyd (1987).
For most countries in the world, it seems entirely appropriate to
assume that their policy has negligible effects on the stock of knowledge.
For those few countries whose policies do significantly affect this stock,
we refer to the stylized fact pointed out by Romer [19871 that over the past
several centuries the world's productivity leader has very rarely been the
world's science and technology leader.
"
Clearly,some of a firm's tangible capital stock such as its vehicles,
and office equipment is probably not firm specific.By treating this entire
capital stock as firm specific, however, we greatly simplify the notation
































'y Is measured output which does not Include x.
29TABLE II!
Level Effects
Steady State RelatIve Outputs
tk.33 .43 .53 .63 .73 .83 .93
T
.33 21.920.6 19.017.0 14.5 11.3 6.51
.43 17.716.6 15.313.7 11.79.125.26
.53 13.612.7 11.810.69.057.034.05
.63 9.809.218.497.616.525.06 2.91
.73 6.30 5.92 5.46 4.90 4.19 3.25 1.87
.83 3.24 3.05 2.81 2.52 2.15 1.67 0,97
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